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rooks offers a critical survey of different normative 
theories of punishment, finding serious problems with 
them all, and argues that we should adopt ‘the unified 
theory of punishment’ that he draws from Hegel and the English 
Idealists.1 I had intended to focus this paper on ‘the unified 
theory’, to ask whether it is indeed both genuinely unified and 
plausible; but I was so taken aback by what Brooks says about the 
definition of punishment in the early pages of the Introduction 
that I have focused instead on that. It might seem misguided to 
devote so much attention to these first few pages: but if one is 
going to engage in definitional discussion, it is important to get it 
right. 
Much ink, at least some of it wasted, has been spilled on the 
definition of punishment.2  Brooks offers this definition [pp. 1-2]: 
(1) Punishment must be for breaking the law. 
(2) Punishment must be of a person for breaking the law. 
(3) Punishment must be administered and imposed intentionally by an 
authority with a legal system. 
(4) Punishment must involve a loss. 
!
1 Thom Brooks, Punishment (London: Routledge, 2012); all bare page references 
in the following text are to this book. 
2 For what is still a useful discussion, see D E Scheid, ‘Note on Defining 
‘Punishment’ (1980) 10 Canadian Journal of Philosophy 453. 
B 
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This definition diverges in some ways from familiar 
definitions, such as Hart’s;3 but Brooks fails to show that the 




Punishment within and outside the Criminal Law 
The most striking divergence from other definitions is that 
Brooks reserves ‘punishment’ for criminal punishment—
punishments imposed by a legal authority for the commission of 
what the law defines as a crime.4  Other kinds of imposition that 
we might call ‘punishment’, ‘in our casual everyday talk’, should 
not properly be so called; the reason for this, it seems, is that 
‘they involve arbitrary executive decisions made by private 
individuals outside of a legal system’. By contrast, when someone 
is subjected to criminal punishment she is ‘not punished simply 
because someone else disagreed with her’, but ‘because of a 
particular act that she performed’ [p. 2]. Now one could indeed 
argue that, given criminal punishment’s distinctive features (the 
harshness of the sanctions it can involve, its relation to the state 
and the state’s coercive power), a justificatory theory of criminal 
punishment will need to be different from whatever justificatory 
theories we might offer of other kinds of punishment—though it 
may be argued in response that we can find useful connections of 
meaning between these various practices of punishment; but to 
!
3 As Brooks notes; see H L A Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (2nd ed; Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 4-5. 
4 I leave aside here the question of whether Brooks would reserve ‘punishment’ 
for criminal punishment, as imposed by a criminal court for the commission of 
a criminal offence; or would also allow us to count e.g. ‘punitive damages’ 
awarded by a civil court as punishments. 
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argue that we should not, when we are being ‘precise’ [p. 2], 
count anything other than criminal punishment as punishment is 
a more radical claim, which Brooks fails to justify, since the 
contrast he draws between criminal punishment and extra-legal 
‘punishments’ is spurious. He is in good company in focusing on 
criminal punishment, and might also appeal to Hart’s limitation 
of ‘the standard or central case of punishment’ to punishment 
imposed by legal authority for offences ‘against legal rules’;5 but 
not even Hart’s company can render his arguments persuasive. 
First, we might agree that what is imposed arbitrarily, for no 
good or relevant reason, is not punishment: the punisher must at 
least claim that there is good reason for the imposition, and that 
reason must involve the punishee’s (alleged) commission of a 
punishable wrong (I comment later on whether such claims and 
allegations must be true). However, just the same is true of 
punishment imposed outside the law. It is true even of the 
example on which Brooks focuses, that of a parent punishing a 
child: if what I do to my child is to count as punishment, I must 
claim that the imposition is justified as a response to some wrong 
of which the child is guilty—i.e. that there is that good and 
relevant reason for what I do. It is more obviously true of other 
kinds of punishment to which Brooks pays less attention. A range 
of institutions—including schools, universities, religious 
organisations, many kinds of business, professional 
associations—operate with codes of ethics or discipline, and with 
officers or committees who are authorised to impose 
punishments on those who violate them: what is imposed can 
count as a punishment only if it is purportedly imposed for the 
commission of a specified offence, and is imposed by someone 
with the authority to do so. Parents and disciplinary committees 
!
5 Hart, n. 3 above, 5; punishments imposed outside the law are ‘relegate[d] to 
the position of sub-standard or secondary cases’. 
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can of course punish arbitrarily: they can define the norms 
arbitrarily or retrospectively; they can reach decisions about guilt 
on inadequate or irrelevant grounds; they can impose 
punishments whose character and severity are arbitrary. But just 
the same is true of criminal courts, and of the legislatures that 
make the laws which the courts apply; such arbitrariness is 
objectionable, for the same kind of reason, in each case. 
Second, some punishments outside the criminal law are 
imposed by ‘private individuals’, as in the case of parents, though 
even there it matters that the parent can claim the authority (legal 
and moral) to punish. Others, however, are imposed by the 
authorised officials of the institution whose code is being applied: 
when a teacher, or a university discipline committee, punishes a 
student for some misconduct, they are not acting as ‘private 
individuals’. We can agree that punishment involves (a claim to) 
authority—and that authority will often be either defined or at 
least constrained by the law; but the authority need not be that of 
a court of law. 
Third, criminal punishment is often, perhaps typically, 
imposed ‘because of a particular act that [the punishee] 
performed’, and not ‘simply because someone else disagreed with 
her’ (nor even just because the court disagreed with her, unless 
the disagreement was about, for instance, whether she had a 
legally cognizable justification for her admitted commission of an 
offence). However, first, it is not a definitional feature even of 
criminal punishment that it must be for an act (even if we take 
‘act’ to include ‘omission’): the law can define thought crimes, or 
crimes of status or condition, for which people can be punished; 
and whilst those who argue that criminal liability, and thus 
punishment, should be imposed only for or on the basis of an act 
will object to such laws, their objection is not and could not 
plausibly be that they are incoherent in authorizing ‘punishment’ 
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for something other than an act.6 Second, in many other punitive 
contexts, punishments are typically imposed for particular acts 
specified in the relevant disciplinary code, and are not imposed 
‘simply because someone … disagreed with’ the person being 
punished: if I am to portray what I impose on you as a 
punishment, I must claim that it is imposed for a breach of some 
norm that I have the authority to enforce. Anything that is to 
count as punishment must be purportedly imposed for an 
‘offence’: but that is not to say either that the offence must be 
one defined as criminal by the law, or that it must consist in or 
involve ‘a particular act’. 
So far, then, we have been given no good reason to reserve 
‘punishment’ for the criminal punishments imposed by legal 
authorities acting under the aegis of the criminal law. Outside the 
criminal law, and outside the law, individuals or bodies can claim 
the authority to impose what they call punishments on those who 
have broken a relevant code or norm; we have been given no 




Punishment as Necessarily of Offenders? 
Punishment, as careful definers often put it, must be of an 
alleged offender for an alleged offence.7 Brooks allows no such 
qualification in his definition: punishment is ‘of a person for 
!
6 See D N Husak, ‘Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?’, in Husak, The 
Philosophy of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 17; R A 
Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (Oxford: 
Hart, 2007), ch. 5. 
7 Compare, among others, Hart (n. 3 above), 5. 
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breaking the law’ [p. 1], and—as if to avoid any doubt—‘[w]hen 
we speak of someone being punished in this book, we refer to 
someone who has committed a crime’ [p. 2]. On the face of it this 
seems an odd restriction, since it forbids us to object that 
punishment is unjust when it is imposed on an innocent person; 
such impositions, on the Brooks definition, do not count as 
punishments, and thus cannot be condemned as unjust 
punishments. Brooks himself seems to ignore this point, when he 
writes of ‘[t]he objection … that it is always unjustified to punish 
those who have not broken the law’:  
[w]hen a person is innocent, this person has not acted in such a way that 
would warrant punishment and, thus, he should be unpunished. [p. 4]  
But if punishment is by definition of someone who has 
committed a crime, the punishment of an innocent is not 
unjustified, or something we should not do; it is impossible.8 
There is a close conceptual connection between punishment 
and guilt, a connection that reflects a deep normative connection 
between justified punishment and guilt, and it might be tempting 
to emphasise the normative connection by presenting it as if it 
were conceptual: 
Even if the world gathered all its strength, there is one thing it is not able 
to do, it can no more punish an innocent one than it can put a dead 
person to death.9 
!
8 See too n. 11 [p. 217]: Brooks tells us that he ‘will speak interchangeably of 
punishment’s “definition” and “justification” … because punishment is 
unjustified where the definitional parts are not fully present’. But if a 
definitional element is missing, there is then no punishment that could be 
either justified or unjustified, as punishment. There might be (depending on 
which elements are present) an imposition of some kind; but the mere fact that 
an imposition does not count as punishment cannot render the imposition 
unjustified. 
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It is a mistake, however, simply to conflate the conceptual and 
the normative connections. The conceptual connection concerns 
what must be claimed or alleged if an imposition is to count as a 
punishment: if what I do to V is to count as punishing her, I 
must claim that she is guilty of an offence to which this imposition 
is a response I am authorised to make. The truth, or 
warrantability, of that claim bears not (directly) on the definitional 
question of whether what I do is punish V, but on the normative 
question of whether or how what I do is justified. 
Consider the two kinds of case in which we might talk (in ‘our 
casual everyday talk’) of punishing an innocent person. In one, V 
is deliberately framed by the police or prosecutor, or is convicted 
by a judge or jury who believe her to be innocent: those who 
procure this result, being aware of the person’s innocence, are 
deliberately punishing an innocent—although if the imposition is 
to count as a punishment at all, they must of course claim that 
she is guilty. In the other kind of case, there is no deliberate 
miscarriage of justice: V is convicted because the lawfully 
obtained evidence of her guilt left, in the court’s honest opinion, 
no room for any ‘reasonable doubt’ of her guilt; but, tragically, 
she is in fact innocent—as might become clear when new 
evidence later emerges.10 Now in the first kind of case a convicted 
innocent might indeed protest that she is not being punished—she 
is being scapegoated, or persecuted. If the claims made about her 
guilt are obviously spurious, if the scapegoating is manifest, we 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 S Kierkegaard, Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing (trans. D Steere; London: 
Fontana, 1961), 85. 
10 These cases mark, of course, the two ends of a spectrum; between them fall 
a range of cases in which there is some more or less serious defect in the way 
in which an innocent person comes to be convicted (corrupt or careless 
investigations, evidence that is not properly examined, the drawing of hasty 
conclusions …), but no deliberate attempt to procure the conviction of a 
known innocent. 
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might agree with her. This is not, however, simply because the 
claim that she is guilty is false: it is because that claim is so 
manifestly fraudulent that what is being done is obviously the 
mere pretence of punishment. In the second kind of case, by 
contrast, we (and she) would be more likely to say that she was 
indeed being punished—but punished mistakenly and thus 
unjustly: for in that case the claim of guilt is made reasonably and 
in good faith. 
This reflects a more general point about a range of concepts, 
of which punishment is one. Sometimes a concept that picks out 
a particular kind of activity or enterprise includes as part of its 
meaning the immediate normative criteria for the success or 
legitimacy of that activity or enterprise: this is true, for instance, 
of such concepts as education, medicine and (as some would 
argue) law itself.11 If a doctor administers a drug to a patient as 
part of his treatment, and the drug harms the patient rather than 
curing him, its administration counts as a failure, as bad medicine, 
by the normative criteria internal to the very idea of medicine: it 
still counts as medical treatment (at least if it is intended to heal 
rather than harm); but it must be judged as defective qua medical 
treatment. If that failure was radical enough, if it would have been 
obvious to any competent doctor that this drug was not suitable, 
we might indeed say (by way of rhetorical emphasis) that he was 
being poisoned rather than treated, or that the doctor was not a 
real doctor but a quack: if something fails radically enough to 
satisfy the core normative criteria for being a good X, we might 
say that it is not (‘really’) an X at all. If the doctor is not even 
aiming to heal rather than harm (if, for instance, she is taking the 
opportunity to harm the patient under the guise of treating him), 
we might say that she is not acting qua doctor, is not engaged 
!
11 See further R A Duff, Trials and Punishments (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), ch. 3. 
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(even badly) in medicine—that she is merely pretending to do so: 
which implies that, as a conceptual matter, medical treatment 
must be aimed at healing or benefitting the patient. We might say 
the same about punishment (though I don’t think that the 
conceptual issue is so clear here): that if an imposition is to count 
as punishment at all, not only must it be claimed that it is being 
imposed on a guilty person, it must be aimed at the guilty; that if 
it is inflicted on someone who is known or believed to be 
innocent, it should no longer count as punishment, but only as a 
pretence of punishment. We might be tempted to say that, but 
need not decide here whether we should say that, or say rather 
that it would be flagrantly unjust as punishment.12 All we need 
note here is that even if punishment must definitionally be aimed 
at the guilty, and must be of the actually guilty if it is to be 
justified as punishment, it counts as punishment (albeit 
necessarily as punishment that fails as punishment) even if it 
misses that aim—even if it is mistakenly imposed on an innocent. 
It might seem that I have laboured this point unnecessarily: for 
I have agreed with Brooks that there is a conceptual or 
definitional connection between punishment and guilt, and that if 
the person on whom some hardship is inflicted is actually 
innocent, then what is inflicted on her cannot be justified as 
punishment; so why should it matter whether we express the 
point by saying (as I would) that it is punishment, but unjustified 
as such; or by saying (as Brooks would) that it is not punishment 
(properly speaking)? It matters partly because we should be clear 
about the difference, and the connections, between definitional 
!
12 The institutional character of criminal punishment might be relevant here: if 
the system as a whole is aimed at punishing only the guilty, its occasional abuse 
by individuals to procure the ‘punishment’ of victims they know to be 
innocent might still count, in virtue of its institutional context and character, as 
punishment. 
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and justificatory claims, and about the different ways in which 
normative criteria might be involved in the criteria for the correct 
application of a concept. But it matters too because if we are 
concerned, as Brooks is, with the justification of criminal 
punishment, we are concerned with a practice that is, like any 
human practice, unavoidably fallible: it will inevitably sometimes 
convict and punish an innocent person, however earnestly those 
working within it try to avoid such errors; if we are going to 
punish anyone, we will sometimes punish an innocent. A 
justification of a system of criminal punishment must thus be a 
justification not of a system that only punishes the guilty, but of a 
system that punishes only those who are found guilty through a 





Punishment and Loss 
Brooks rightly resists [p. 5] the suggestion that punishment 
must include pain; instead, he suggests, we should define it in 
terms of ‘loss’.13 But what is not clear from his definition is 
whether that loss must be intended as a loss. Punishment must be 
‘imposed intentionally’, and ‘must involve a loss’ [p. 2]; but that 
leaves open the possibility that the loss could be a foreseen, but 
not intended, aspect of the imposition. When a tort defendant 
loses his case and is ordered to pay damages to the plaintiff, that 
!
13 I’d rather say that punishment must be burdensome, to emphasise that 
punishment can be undertaken willingly by a repentant offender: whilst I can 
willingly undertake or embrace a burden, as a burden, I cannot do more than 
accept a loss as a necessary cost of something else—I cannot embrace it as a 
loss. 
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payment involves a loss (though the loss might be relatively 
painless, if the amount is small relative to his means); but ordinary 
damages are not understood as punishment, even if they are 
awarded by a legal authority against a person who has broken the 
law in the sense that he has failed to take the care that, according 
to the law, he ought to take.14 
It might seem that, on a plausible reading of Brooks’ 
definition, the loss must be intended as a loss: for if punishment 
‘must involve a loss’, as part of its meaning, to intend to impose 
punishment must be to intend to impose loss; if I intend what I 
do to count as punishment, I must intend it to involve a loss. A 
later comment, however, suggests otherwise. 
Suppose there is a violent psychopath. He is genuinely suffering from 
psychopathic delusions that compel him to attempt killing innocent 
persons without provocation. He lacks culpability for his actions, but these 
actions present a clear danger to the public. The unified theory of 
punishment might argue that the violent psychopath should be 
incapacitated regardless of culpability. [pp. 140-1] 
Now if this person’s incapacitation is to be justified by a 
theory of punishment, it presumably must be justified precisely as a 
punishment; but is that how we should understand this kind of 
incapacitation? One puzzle is that it is not clear what sort of case 
Brooks has in mind, since ‘psychopathy’ is not normally 
understood as involving ‘delusions’ which might ‘compel’ the 
person to violence; that is one reason why there is continuing 
controversy about the criminal responsibility, and culpability, of 
!
14 That is of course why ‘punitive damages’ are distinguished from ordinary 
damages: they are intended not, like ordinary damages, to provide 
compensation for the harm suffered by the plaintiff, but rather to burden the 
defendant. 
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psychopaths.15 So a theory of punishment might well justify the 
punishment of a violent psychopath, on the simple grounds that 
he is culpably guilty. But if we instead think of someone who 
lacks culpability, because his actions were ‘compel[ed]’ by his 
delusions (someone who would count as psychotic rather than as 
psychopathic), then it is not clear why we should count his 
detention as a punishment. He would, if he came to trial at all, be 
a strong candidate for the insanity defence—rightly so, if he lacks 
culpability. The court would no doubt order his detention in a 
psychiatric institution, to protect both him and others; but it 
would not do so as a criminal punishment for his crime—at least 
as we normally understand the idea of punishment. The key point 
here seems to be that if our aim is simply to incapacitate someone 
who is radically disordered and non-culpable, in order to protect 
others, it surely should not be our intention to inflict any loss on 
him. The only sufficiently secure method of incapacitation might 
in fact involve a loss; but if we could sufficiently incapacitate 
without inflicting loss, we should do so; and we should try to 
minimise whatever loss cannot be avoided. This is, of course, a 
standard way of distinguishing the compulsory detention of the 
mentally disordered from the punishment of culpably responsible 
offenders: the latter, but not the former, must be intended to be 
burdensome (or to cause a loss, in Brooks’ terms). But it seems 
that Brooks would count all such detentions as punishments, if 
the detained person has committed a crime, since all involve a 
loss (of freedom).16 
!
15 For some useful recent readings, see L Malatesti and J McMillan (eds.), 
Responsibility and Psychopathy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
16 There might be room for argument about whether the incapacitative 
detention of a non-culpable, disordered offender is imposed for his crime: but 
that is not something that seems open to Brooks, given what he says about the 
deluded, non-culpable ‘violent psychopath’. 
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There are two ways in which Brooks could deal with this issue. 
One—the more orthodox way—would be to distinguish 
punishment from other modes of crime-related state coercion by 
holding that punishment must be intended to cause loss (or to be 
burdensome); in which case a theory of punishment, unified or 
not, will have nothing to say about the incapacitative detention of 
the non-culpably dangerous (except that it is not punishment). 
The other would be to expand the definition of punishment to 
cover such coercive practices as the detention of the non-culpably 
dangerous; but then we would need to know how far that 
expansion should go. In particular, if the focus is on preventing 
the dangerous from harming others, why should the commission 
of a crime be a condition for detention: it might be evidentially 
significant, but if we could be confident that they are dangerous 
on the basis of other evidence, why wait until they kill? That 
would not count as ‘punishment’ in ‘our casual everyday talk’; but 
if what we justifiably do to the ‘violent psychopath’ to prevent his 
further crimes is to count as justified punishment, it is not clear 
why punishment in its now expanded sense should require an 
(alleged) offender. 
My own view is that we should, for the sake of both analytic 
and normative clarity, stick with the narrower definition of 
criminal punishment, as an intentionally burdensome response to 
one who has been convicted of committing a crime: that is a 
distinctive practice, different in its normative character from 
other coercive practices such as the detention of those judged to 
be in some way dangerous; if it is to be justified at all, it requires a 
distinctive normative rationale. I suspect that this is also Brooks’ 
view: but then he needs, first, to make clear that punishment 
must be intended to involve a loss; and second, to rethink his 
comments about the ‘violent psychopath’. 
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IV 
Punishment and Expression 
Another way in which some theorists would distinguish 
punishment from other kinds of coercive imposition is by arguing 
that punishment involves, definitionally, the expression or 
communication of censure or condemnation.17 When we punish 
an offender, the burden we impose is not merely a burden; it 
carries, and is intended to convey, a message about what he did. 
(Such a definitional claim is not yet a normative claim about the 
proper justifying aims of punishment: it is, rather, a claim about 
just what it is that needs to be justified if we are to justify a 
system of punishment.) 
Brooks notes, and gives short shrift to, the definitional claim 
[pp. 3-4].18 Now the claim is certainly arguable—but his rejection 
of it is radically under-argued. He finds in Feinberg’s article an 
identification of ‘punishment’ with imprisonment, other species 
of non-custodial sanction being classed as ‘penalties’: but, as he 
notes, most convicted offenders receive non-custodial sentences; 
a theory of punishment that counted only imprisonment as 
punishment would not be a theory of punishment as we practise 
it. Feinberg does sometimes appear to identify punishment (as 
expressive), or the ‘hard treatment’ that constitutes punishment, 
with imprisonment, though elsewhere he is more careful to 
recognise that imprisonment is just one form of punishment. 
!
17 See, for different versions of this idea, J Feinberg, ‘The Expressive Function 
of Punishment’, in Feinberg, Doing and Deserving (Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1970) 95; I Primoratz, ‘Punishment as Language’ (1989) 64 
Philosophy 187; A von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1993); R A Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001). 
18 He pays more attention later (ch. 6) to normative theories of punishment as 
expression or communication. 
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Penal theorists also sometimes talk as if criminal punishment 
consists in and only in imprisonment (or capital punishment). 
But, first, other theorists, including some who take censure-
communication to be a defining feature of punishment, make it 
clear that criminal punishment need not be custodial, and argue 
that we should make less use of prison than we do.19 Second, the 
fact that both criminal punishment, and what Feinberg and others 
count as ‘penalties’ rather than ‘punishments’, can consist in a 
fine does not by itself go any way towards showing that we 
cannot usefully distinguish punishments, as communicating 
censure, from penalties as mere sanctions. Brooks argues that 
[t]he view that penalties  and ‘punishments’ (understood as imprisonment) 
are different in character is … a distinction drawn too sharply that we 
should reject. [p. 3] 
However, if punishment is ‘understood as imprisonment’, it is 
clearly different in character from non-custodial penalties: the 
distinction between custodial and non-custodial sanctions can be 
drawn quite sharply and clearly.20 More importantly, if we 
understand punishment to encompass a range of non-custodial 
sanctions, we can still draw a clear distinction between censure-
communicating punishment and penalties that lack such a 
communicative dimension. 
Monetary sanctions provide the simplest example here. An 
official requirement to pay a specified sum of money could 
constitute any of a variety of kinds of imposition: it could be a tax 
demand; an award of damages, or an order to pay a sum owed, 
arising from a civil case; an administrative penalty for breach of a 
!
19 See e.g. von Hirsch, n. 17 above; Duff, n. 17 above. 
20 Though some glossing would be needed to deal with such phenomena as the 
suspended prison sentence, or with cases in which breaching the requirements 
of a non-custodial sanction can attract a prison sentence. 
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non-criminal regulation; or a criminal punishment imposed 
following conviction. What the requirement amounts to, what it 
means, depends on the grounds on which it is made; on the 
institutional context in which it is made; and on the terms or 
tones (themselves determined partly by the institutional context) 
in which it is made. On the definitional suggestion under 
discussion here, it should count as a punishment only if it is 
intended to convey a formal censure of the conduct because of 
which the requirement is made. 
Such a distinction is formally drawn, for instance, in German 
law, which distinguishes crimes (Straftaten) from regulatory 
infractions (Ordnungswidrigkeiten), the latter being dealt with under 
a regulatory code that is separate from the criminal code. 
Monetary sanctions are available under both codes—as criminal 
fines (Geldstrafen) for Straftaten, as administrative penalties 
(Geldbussen) for Ordnungswidrigkeiten. The meaning of the monetary 
sanction is, however, different in the two cases: for crimes attract 
a formal condemnation expressed in the sanction—the fine is 
imposed for conduct that is reproachable (vorwerfbar) and 
blameworthy (schuldig), whereas administrative penalties lack such 
a censorial meaning.21 I do not suggest that the distinction is 
unproblematic:22 but it is not a manifestly untenable distinction; 
and one could not accuse German law of confusing punishment 
with imprisonment. 
There is room for argument about whether it is useful to 
include censure-communication in our definition of (criminal) 
!
21 See Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten (1968; consolidated in 1975); for a useful 
(and critical) introduction see T Weigend, ‘The Legal and Practical Problems 
Posed by the Difference between Criminal Law and Administrative Penal Law’ 
(1988) 59 Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal 67. 
22 See the doubts raised by the European Court of Human Rights in e.g. Öztürk 
v Germany (1984) 6 EHRR 409; also Weigend, n. 21 above. 
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punishment, to mark out the particular kind of practice that is to 
be theorised; but Brooks’ selective critique of Feinberg does not 
give us reason to doubt the possibility, or utility, of distinguishing 





It is not clear how much time it is useful to spend on the 
definition of punishment (or of criminal punishment). We do 
need to mark out the particular practice, or range of practices, 
that we aim to subject to normative theorising; but that is not to 
say that we need to offer a ‘definition’ of punishment. However, 
if we are going to offer a definition, as Brooks does at the start of 
his book, we need to do so with care and attention to detail—
something that I fear Brooks has failed to do. 
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